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DRIVER BEHAVIOR AND LEGAL SANCTIONS:
A STUDY OF DETERRENCE
Roger C. Cramton*
T HROUGHOUT the ages legal sanctions have been created and en-
forced in part because they were thought to channel human
behavior in desired directions. With the increase in governmental
activity resulting from the complexity and interdependence of mod-
em society, emphasis on the purposive use of legal sanctions has in-
creased. Law is no longer widely viewed as mysterious, sacred, and
relatively immutable, but as a rational tool that can assist in accom-
plishing social purposes. Increased reliance on governmental con-
trols, however, involves risks of undue intrusion upon individual
choice and other harmful consequences. Careful examination of
existing and proposed legislation to determine whether its purposes
are likely to be achieved-and at what cost in terms of social effort
and undesired consequences-is now a necessity rather than a luxury
that a more limited government might eschew.
A rational society will design its legal arrangements so that, in-
sofar as convenient and possible, undesired and antisocial behavior
is minimized and socially useful behavior is encouraged. If the soci-
ety values the independence and dignity of its individual members,
it will both minimize the use of official coercion and tolerate a con-
siderable free zone between prohibited and encouraged behavior,
thus avoiding the situation in which everything that is not forbidden
is compulsory.
The prevention of needless death, injury, and loss is universally
desired by reasonable men. More specifically, a reduction in the level
of deaths, personal injuries, and economic loss resulting from wide-
spread use of motor vehicles is clearly an appropriate objective of
regulatory action. There is controversy concerning only the tech-
niques that should be used and the level of societal effort that is
appropriate. Obviously, some forms of control will work better than
others. And at some point countervailing values, such as freedom in
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan. A.B. 1950, Harvard University; J.D.
1955, University of Chicago.-Ed.
This Article was prepared originally as a paper for delivery at the Auto Insur-
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the use of one's vehicle, efficiency in transportation, minimization of
coercion, and preservation of privacy and individual dignity, will
outweigh the desire to make further savings of life, limb, or prop-
erty. Society must determine the point at which a further reduction
in highway accidents is no longer worth the price that must be paid.
Policy-making is so widely diffused in our society that a vast number
of individuals and organizations participate in striking this balance,
sometimes through conscious actions and sometimes by taking indi-
vidual steps that indirectly affect the ultimate choice (if only by
limiting the range of practical choice for the conscious policy-
makers). The special task of the behavioral scientist is to analyze
alternative legal arrangements from various points of view and to
provide as accurate a statement as possible concerning the actual or
expected benefits and costs of existing and proposed arrangements.
With this information (or its best practicable approximation) policy-
makers may make an informed and rational choice of various modes
and levels of social control.
Highway safety is no different from other social problems in this
respect. Aside from the effectiveness of capital punishment as a
deterrent,1 there has been little study of the effectiveness of legal
sanctions in achieving their purported goals. Contemporary prob-
lems in the control of drug addiction,2 the enforcement of selective
service laws,3 the demand for gun control legislation 4-all of these
are fit subjects for similar scrutiny. Attention has been devoted to
highway safety primarily because there is wide acceptance of the
regulatory objectives (reduction of accidents and facilitation of traf-
fic movement), because the frequency of occurrence of offenses pro-
duces a massive amount of data for analysis, and because the low
moral content of most traffic offenses makes possible a freedom of
experimentation with enforcement and treatment methods that
cannot be duplicated in more sensitive areas.
A diverse group of legal sanctions--criminal, civil, and admin-
istrative-is presently employed in order to control driver behavior
so as to reduce accidents and facilitate traffic movement. Do these
sanctions have the desired effects? At what costs are the sanctions
1. See Sellin, The Death Penalty, in MODEL PENAL CODE app. (Tent. Draft No. 9,
1959).
2. See I. CHEIN, THE ROAD TO H: NARCOTICS, DELINQUENCY, AND SOCIAL POLICY
(1964); W. ELDREDGE, NARCOTICS AND THE LAW (2d ed. 1967).
3. See Griffiths, Punitive Reclassification of Registrants Who Turn in Their Draft
Cards, 1 SE.ECTrrE S. VxcE L. REP. 4001 (1968).
4. Zimring, Is Gun Control Likely to Reduce Violent Killing? 35 U. Cnx. L. Rzv.
721 (1968).
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employed, not only in terms of direct expense but also in terms of
side effects and unintended consequences? Would alternative ar-
rangements be more effective? Answering such questions requires
both accurate and relevant data, and a general theoretical perspec-
tive that considers legal sanctions as part of larger social processes
and systems.
We currently lack both the data and the theory needed to assess
accurately the effectiveness of sanction programs.5 A start has been
made, however, and tentative answers as to the effectiveness and costs
of particular legal sanctions are becoming available.6 Only as knowl-
edge accumulates will guesswork disappear from the task of striking
a proper balance between highway safety and other values. Although
quick and easy results cannot be expected, the accumulation of use-
ful knowledge is not beyond our capabilities. This Article considers
first the general understanding of legal scholars and criminologists
regarding the deterrent effect of legal sanctions; a second part sum-
marizes current knowledge concerning the effects of legal sanctions
in controlling driver behavior; and a concluding section evaluates
briefly the methods available for the development of needed new
knowledge.
I. LEGAL SANcTIONS AS A TECHNIQUE OF PREVENTION
A. Some Definitions
Before examining the general deterrent effect of legal sanctions,
definition of terms used throughout this Article is in order.7 The
term prevention refers to social arrangements or techniques of con-
trol that reduce the rate of something society wants to avert. Im-
proved highway design, standards for vehicle performance, and
enforcement of traffic regulations are all examples of differing tech-
niques of prevention in the highway safety field.
A legal sanction8 is a prevention technique that involves the
official imposition of consequences (positive or negative) for the pur-
pose of enforcing legal obligations. The term is used in a broad
sense to include civil liability, criminal punishment, rehabilitative
5. See generally Andenaes, The General Preventive Effects of Punishment, 114
U. PA. L. R v. 949 (1966); Arens & Lasswell, Toward A General Theory of Sanctions,
49 IowA L. Rav. 233 (1964); Schwartz & Orleans, On Legal Sanctions, 34 U. CHI. L.
Rav. 274 (1967); F. Zimring, An Essay on Threat, 1966 (unpublished manuscript at the
University of Michigan Law School).
6. See Andenaes, supra note 5; Zimring, supra note 5.
7. Similar usage is employed in Andenaes, supra note 5, at 949-51; F. Zimring,
supra note 5, at 1-5.
8. See Schwartz & Orleans, On Legal Sanctions, 34 U. CI. L. Rxv. 274 (1967).
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treatment, grants and benefits, and other methods of applying legal
norms to particular individuals.
Deterrent sanctions are forms of legal sanctions involving a gov-
ernmental command ("do not exceed 30 mph") and a concomitant
threat ("or you will be fined ten dollars"). In considering deterrence,
it is important to distinguish between "general deterrence" and "spe-
cial deterrence." General deterrence9 refers to the influence of the
threatened consequence upon the population to whom the legal
command is addressed. The term includes the moral, educative, and
habituative influence of the legal norm and sanction. Special deter-
rence,'0 on the other hand, refers to the effect of punishment or
treatment on the particular person who experiences it. For this indi-
vidual the legal sanction is no longer a threatened consequence but
an actual one. The experience of punishment or treatment may
influence his behavior by changing his personality, character, or
attitudes. In any event, the general deterrent effect on the punished
individual in the future is likely to be different than it is with the
remainder of the population: further stigmatization may have less
impact since the individual has already been stigmatized; the un-
pleasant consequences of treatment or privation are viewed as they
actually have been experienced rather than as they were perceived
in advance of that experience; and, the repetition of violation is
commonly met with harsher sanctions than are applied to first-time
violators.
B. General Deterrence
Today it is generally accepted by criminologists that revenge and
punishment, for their own sake and without regard to the conse-
quences flowing from them, have no place in a rational society."
The coercive force of the state should be applied in order to channel
the behavior of members of society in desired directions. Infliction
of suffering, if it does not improve the offender or deter violations,
is needless cruelty that should be avoided. It is not suggested that
harsh penalties or even terror are necessarily ineffective in shaping
behavior. The experience in totalitarian regimes demonstrates that
these tactics can be effective.' 2 The point is that harsh penalties, if
9. See Andenaes, supra note 5, at 949-51.
10. Morris, Impediments to Penal Reform, 33 U. CH. L. REv. 627, 632 (1966).
For the special effects of punishment on the individuals who experience it, see D.
GLAZER, THm EFFECriVENESS OF A PRISON AND PAROLE SYSTEM 13-35 (1964).
11. Morris, supra note 10, at 627-30. See also H. PACKER, T1E LiMrrs oF THE
CRIMINAL SANCrION 9-148 (1968).
12. See Andenaes, supra note 5, at 964-70.
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justifiable at all, serve social purposes only if they achieve dramatic
results of general or special deterrence.
It is fashionable to argue, starting from the valid premise that the
death penalty does not deter murder more than such sanctions as life
imprisonment, 13 that legal sanctions do not have significant deterrent
effects. 14 If this were the case a wholesale re-examination and possible
abandonment of present controls would be in order, although it is
doubtful whether legislators or the general citizenry would be pre-
pared to experiment with a sanctionless society. However, the argu-
ment that legal sanctions are ineffective is fallacious, for there is
ample evidence that legal sanctions do affect human behavior in
desired directions. 5
Psychologists tell us that punishment may effectively modify
human behavior under certain circumstances. 6 Punishment is effec-
tive in reducing prohibited behavior when motivation to engage in
this behavior is low, or, even if it is high, when alternative modes of
behavior can be used to reach the desired goal. When punishment
is certain and severe, behavior may be modified in some situations
even though the behavior involved is highly motivated and alterna-
tive modes of behavior are unavailable. Experiments with human
and animal subjects also indicate that punishment produces vari-
ability in behavior-the punished organism tries a variety of acts
until it finds one that is satisfactory. Rewards, on the other hand,
lead to consistent behavior-the rewarded act is preferred to other,
unrewarded acts. And punishment is much more effective in chan-
neling behavior away from proscribed activity when it is coupled
with rewards or other constructive alternatives for engaging in
desired activity1 7 The timing of rewards and penalties is also an
13. Norval Morris's careful evaluation of the capital punishment controversy con-
cludes that it is "as well established as almost any other proposition in the social
sciences, that the existence or non-existence of capital punishment as a sanction
alternative to protracted imprisonment for convicted murderers, makes no difference
to the murder rate or the attempted murder rate." Morris, supra note 10, at 633. Two
qualifications of this conclusion should be noted: First, it cannot be inferred that
deterrence is inoperative but only that a difference in punishment (death as against
protracted imprisonment) does not affect the murder rate. Second, "general deterrence
continues to operate, but in a perhaps unexpected way," in that "the difference of
penalty influences peripherally the victim selection process." Id.
14. E.g., H. BARNES & N. TrERs, NEw HoluzoN IN CRIMINOLOGY 338 (2d ed. 1951):
"The claim for deterrence is belied by both history and logic. History shows that
severe punishments have never reduced criminality to any marked degree."
15. The best discussion of available evidence is in Andenaes, supra note 5. See
also Andenaes, General Prevention-Illusion or Reality? 43 J. CUm. L.C. & P.S. 176
(1952).
16. J. DEESE, THE PsYCHoLoGY OF LEARNING 135-41 (2d ed. 1958).
17. Lefkowitz, Blake, - Morton, Status Factors in Pedestrian Violation of Traffic
January 1969] 425
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important factor since their effectiveness increases as immediacy of
application follows the occurrence of the rewarded or prohibited
act.
Legal scholars have summarized the reasons why the imposition
of a legal sanction may affect the behavior of the population to
whom it is addressed.' s First, the existence of a legal command has a
moral and educative influence. Many persons want to do what is
right, and they are obedient and respectful of the law even when
they disagree with its provisions. Second, other persons who are
less responsive to moral suasion may be deterred because of fear of
the consequences of disobedience. They make a rational choice not
to engage in contemplated conduct because the risks of apprehension
are too great, or the punishment is too severe, or both. This effect
will be operative-in fact may be enhanced-by imperfect knowl-
edge of the objective apprehension rate or the severity of the
punishment actually meted out to offenders. It is the individual's
perception of these factors, rather than the objective circumstance
itself, that deters. This offers the possibility that educational cam-
paigns may be used to delude members of the community into
believing that legal sanctions are more threatening than they really
are. If the community is convinced that "drunk drivers go to jail,"
when in fact they seldom do, the perceived threat is an important
reality-except to those whose experience of the actual punishment
process has provided more accurate information. A third and final
effect, particularly important in the field of highway safety, rests
upon the notion that fear and moral influence, especially if instilled
at an early age, may create unconscious inhibitions that make lawful
and desired behavior habitual behavior. Thus the deterrent effect of
legal sanctions is not entirely dependent upon a Benthamite model
of rational human behavior-the avoidance of pain and the maxi-
mization of pleasure. Legal provisions and their applications may
affect even those who are unaware of them. As Professor Andenaes
has stated:
Through a process of learning and social imitation, norms and
taboos may be transmitted to persons who have no ideas about their
origins-in much the same way that innovations in Parisian fashions
appear in the clothing of country girls who have never heard of
Dior and Lanvin.19
Signals, 51 J. ABNORMAL & Soc. PSYCH. 704 (1955) (prohibition plus constructive alter-
natives more effective in changing behavior than prohibition alone).
18. Andenaes, supra note 5; Morris, supra note 10; F. Zimring, supra note 5.
19. Andenaes, supra note 5, at 951.
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These general deterrent influences are highly variable depending
upon such factors as motivation to engage in the prohibited be-
havior, the personality of the potential offender, and the conflicting
norms of groups to which the individual owes loyalty and affection.20
Apart from these general variables, the effectiveness of a legal sanc-
tion depends upon two fundamental factors: (1) the perceived risk
of detection, apprehension, and conviction; and (2) the severity of
the penalty. There is widespread agreement among legal scholars
that the first factor is more significant in controlling deviant be-
havior than the second, although here again differences among
persons and social classes may modify this general conclusion. Overly
severe penalties engender a rebound effect which reduces deterrence
by lowering the conviction rate: enforcement officials, judges, and
juries are reluctant to prosecute or convict if the punishment is
regarded as too severe for the offense involved.
A point worth emphasizing is that human behavior is profoundly
affected by the actor's view of what is respectable. As a result, the
law is most likely to have substantial deterrent effects in those situa-
tions in which it is able to define for the affected community what
is respectable behavior. When the process works, the primary deter-
rent is the fear of loss of community esteem. Thus the threat of
punishment fails to regulate behavior effectively when the forbidden
behavior is approved in the relevant community and when no loss
of prestige accompanies the imposition of penalties. Examples of this
principle are found in juvenile gangs, and, more recently, in situa-
tions of conscientious law objection or civil disobedience.
A controlled experiment in the reduction of serious highway
accidents involving servicemen at the Lackland Air Force Base in
Texas illustrates the potential effectiveness of general deterrence in
highway safety.21 Military authorities were troubled by the large
number of personal-injury accidents involving servicemen driving
privately owned automobiles in the vicinity of their stations. A study
revealed that excessive drinking was a contributing factor in ap-
proximately two thirds of these accidents. After considering and re-
jecting alternative countermeasures, such as advance screening and
counseling of drivers, a prevention program was designed that
involved two administratively imposed sanctions: a driver involved
in a personal-injury accident was called in for a review of his service
record and for a psychiatric examination. An accompanying educa-
20. F. Zimring, supra note 5, at 13-21.
21. Barmack & Payne, The Lackland Accident Countermeasure Experiment, in
AccmENT RsEAiCH, MEmomS ANm APPROACHES 665 (1964).
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tional effort tried to portray driving after drinking as disturbed or
"sick" behavior. The effects of the program were studied by com-
paring accident rates before and after its institution and by com-
paring the experience at Lackland with the accident rate in the
general community and at other bases at which the program was not
adopted.
The young Americans involved in this experiment apparently
viewed these sanctions (review of service record and psychiatric
examination) as threatening; personal-injury accidents involving the
affected group declined over fifty per cent in the year following the
introduction of the program. Before concluding that this effect had
been caused by the prevention program, Professors Barmack and
Payne, the investigators in this careful and well-executed experi-
ment, examined and rejected plausible rival hypotheses such as other
influences operating in the same direction or a general decline in
servicemen's accidents. In fact, during the period in question, ac-
cidents continued to rise in the general community and at other
military bases. Of course, one cannot generalize from the special
population involved in this study-servicemen subject to institu-
tional military control-to the larger civilian population using the
highways, but the study demonstrates what sometimes is doubted:
that countermeasures can be effective.
The fact that sanctions may produce the desired results does not
mean, of course, that they will necessarily do so, or that the costs and
possible side effects may not outweigh any benefits. The application
of legal sanctions inevitably involves economic and social costs: en-
forcement machinery requires substantial expenditures of public
funds; each individual to whom sanctions are applied suffers incon-
venience, expense, and more intangible losses of self-esteem and
repute; and the atmosphere created by enforcement activities may
affect the tone of the society-particularly the balance between
privacy and official surveillance. Moreover, sanctions may produce
negative effects on some individuals from which wholly unintended
-and undesirable-consequences may flow. Thus, the existence of
a legal sanction or its application may worsen the driving behavior
of an antisocial or self-deprecatory person who is none too good a
driver to begin with.
The celebrated 1956 Connecticut speeding crackdown illustrates
the difficulty of determining whether changes in the legal environ-
ment accomplish what they are supposed to accomplish. In late 1955,
Governor Ribicoff of Connecticut announced as part of a crackdown
on speeders a plan whereby a convicted speeder would have his
driver's license suspended for a minimum period of thirty days.
[Vol. 67:421
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During the first year of the crackdown, highway fatalities in Con-
necticut declined about twelve per cent, and Governor Ribicoff
hailed the program as a success. Professors Ross and Campbell, who
with the benefit of hindsight and social science methodology exam-
ined the Connecticut experience in detail, concluded that plausible
rival hypotheses probably explained the changes hailed by Ribicoff.22
When the fatality rates in Connecticut and in nearby states were
plotted over a longer period, it became evident that 1955 (the year
prior to the crackdown) was an extremely bad year; the lower fatality
rate in 1956 would have been expected in any event as a regression
to the mean, since the modest change noted in 1956 was well within
normal yearly variation of fatality rates. Moreover, nearby states ex-
perienced a similar decline of fatality rates during the same period.
Thus it cannot be conclusively established that the Connecticut
speeding crackdown reduced highway fatalities. But the data does
indicate that the crackdown had other unforeseen consequences, in-
cluding a dramatic reduction in speeding convictions, a dramatic
increase in license suspensions due to speeding, and increased inci-
dence of driving under suspension.23 The Connecticut legal system
apparently made adjustments that reflected the greater seriousness
of the speeding offense: fewer drivers were arrested on speeding
charges, and of those arrested a substantially larger number were
found not guilty.
In short, there is ample evidence that human behavior can be
influenced by the application of legal sanctions. The crucial ques-
tions that need more specific and detailed answers are: (1) Who can
be influenced, under what circumstances or conditions, and to what
degree? (2) What costs and side effects do the application of legal
sanctions entail? (3) What alternative modes of inducing compliance
are available and what results will they produce at what cost?
II. PREVENTION OF UNWANTED DRIVER BEHAVIOR
A. Parking Regulations
Legal sanctions have proven to be extremely effective in the
enforcement of parking regulations.24 Illegal parking behavior is
22. H. Ross & D. Campbell, The Connecticut Speed Crackdown: A Study of the
Effects of Legal Change, 1968, at 3 (unpublished report).
23. Professors Ross and Campbell report that license suspensions for speeding, in
relation to all suspensions, increased from about 10 per cent to over 25 per cent; that
speeding violations, in relation to all traffic violations, decreased from about 18 per
cent to about 12 per cent; that arrests for driving under suspension increased dramati-
cally; and that the proportion of speeding violators found not guilty more than
doubled. Id. at tables 4-7.
24. Chambliss, The Deterrent Influence of Punishment, 12 CRIME & DELINQUENCY
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deterred effectively by consistent application of relatively minor
penalties in the form of monetary fines. Increments of either the
apprehension rate or the level of fines produce measurable reduc-
tions in the incidence of illegal parking. Why is it that very modest
sanctions can have such a dramatic effect on human behavior in this
context? Parking is a rational activity in which everyone who drives
engages. The choice of a particular parking space is controlled
largely by considerations of convenience. Free parking near the
driver's destination is preferred, but different combinations of paid
parking or remote location are available if the cost or inconvenience
of nearby parking increases. The parking fine tends to be viewed as a
cost of doing business roughly equivalent to a commercial parking
fee. If the fine is sufficiently low, or a low apprehension rate effec-
tively reduces the per-unit parking cost, many persons will violate
the law rather than use alternatives. There is no intense motivation
to engage in the prohibited behavior (contrast the behavior of the
worried husband who parks illegally when rushing his pregnant wife
to the hospital); other choices generally exist and will be preferred
if violation is more costly or inconvenient.
The population that engages in illegal parking is virtually a
replication of the entire adult community. Occupational and status
groups are included in this population in approximately the same
proportions as they are in the community as a whole. In this respect
the parking violation is a prime example of a "folk crime"--one
with very little moral content in which many members of the com-
munity participate. A suggestive study by Professor Ross indicates
that as traffic offenses become more serious (along a spectrum from
parking to moving violations to reckless driving to drunk driving to
negligent homicide), the group of offenders becomes more and more
similar in its occupational and status characteristics to the criminal
population engaged in offenses against persons and property. 5 Simi-
larly, the moral content of traffic offenses increases through the same
stages.
B. Moving Violations
Although hunch, common sense, and scattered evidence suggest
that traffic law enforcement is valuable in controlling driver be-
70 (1966); U. MooI & C. CA.LAHAN, LAW AND LEARNINo THEORY: A STUDY IN LEGAL
CONROL (1943).
25. Ross, Traffic Law Violation-A Folk Crime, in ACCIDENT RFsEARc-, METHODS
AND APPROACHES 496 (1964).
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havior, the magnitude of the likely effect is uncertain.26 Without
further research we simply do not know how successful we are in
deterring accident-producing driving behavior by penalizing traffic
offenders or how the present system of control could be improved.
It is sometimes argued that deterrence is likely to be ineffective
in controlling negligent as distinct from intentional behavior and
that the complexity of the driving task further limits deterrent pos-
sibilities. While the legal command in traffic regulation-sometimes
hardly less general than "drive safely"-is a more complex directive
than the simple injunction not to do a prohibited act that requires
conscious effort (for instance, "do not steal"), this difference does not
justify a conclusion that deterrence will necessarily fail. Standards
of care are effectively enforced in industry, transportation, and many
other contexts by intense policing and meaningful penalties. The
improved performance of a basketball player operating under four
fouls provides a homely illustration.
Driving, like walking, is an extraordinarily complex activity that
soon becomes habitual. The principal role of deterrence is to instill
habitual modes of performance in compliance with minimal stan-
dards. Presumably if a driver has fallen into bad habits (or failed to
develop good ones), a citation for a violation will make him aware
of his deficiencies. A more frequent and relatively benign occurrence
(the violation) is substituted for the more serious but unlikely hazard
(the accident) which nonetheless becomes more likely if bad driving
habits are not corrected. Once the driver is aware of his inadequacies,
a process of self-correction may take place; over a period of time
habitually correct performance may gradually replace the conscious
attempt to correct deficiency.
Another argument minimizing the deterrent role of traffic regula-
tion rests upon the strong motivation for personal safety that drivers
are thought to possess. Drivers, it is assumed, are aware of the hazards
of driving; if they are not deterred by a concern for their own safety
or for that of their passengers-to say nothing of the property
interest in their vehicles-how can the minor penalties exacted for
traffic violations be expected to influence their conduct? Although
this argument has some force, it does not preclude the possibility
that a substantial group of drivers are deterred by the possible ap-
plication of legal sanctions. In the first place, a serious accident is an
extraordinarily infrequent event from the point of view of the indi-
vidual driver. A personal injury accident occurs only once in every
26. The available literature is reviewed in A. D. LITTLE, INC., THE STATE OF THE
ART OF TRAFFIC SAFETY 229-96 (1966).
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225,000 vehicle miles; a fatality only once in every 18,000,000 vehicle
miles.27 In the driving context the odds of an unpleasant occurrence
are more influential in shaping driver behavior than the potential
severity of the occurrence. 28 Thus, although the consequences of a
traffic accident could be staggering, the risk of its occurrence may
be so remote as to have little impact on driver conduct. By contrast,
even though the chances of detection for particular violations may
be low, the public is more aware of the risk of being apprehended
for a traffic violation. The consequences of apprehension-con-
frontation with a police officer, appearance in court, and possible
license suspension-are much more visible and immediate than the
relatively remote possibility of an accident. Thus, traffic regulation
may play a significant role in shaping driver behavior. Even if this
were not the case, it would be a mistake to assume too much ration-
ality in the relatively habitual and unthinking behavior that takes
place behind the wheel. Just as many smokers ignore warnings of
the health hazard of cigarettes,2 9 drivers may ignore or underestimate
the hazards of the road. Concerns of the moment, such as anxiety,
shortage of time, and desire to impress peers, may interfere with
rational consideration of risks of driving. Individuals who for safety
reasons consider such matters as the most appropriate times to drive,
routes to be taken, and vehicles to be selected, are likely to be
eautious drivers in any event; they are not part of the critical
audience to whom the law's command is particularly addressed-
those who are inclined to be careless and to violate.80
Some observers believe that effective enforcement of traffic laws
is limited by the relatively mild penalties that are invoked for most
moving violations. There is little evidence to support this view, how-
ever, and the Connecticut experience described above suggests that
more severe penalties would be less certain of application because of
official and popular resistance.3' Moreover, mild threats that involve
27. NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS 40 (1968). In 1967 there were 53,400
motor vehicle fatalities in the United States or a rate of 5.47 fatalities per 100,000,000
vehicle miles.
28. Edwards, We Drive as We Live, ANALOGY, Spring, 1968, at 20-21.
29. See generally Janis & Feshbach, Effects of Fear-Arousing Communications, 48
J. ABNORMAL & SoC. PsYcH. 78 (1953).
30. There is a great deal of inferential evidence to support the proposition that
the people who listen to safety messages are likely to be safer drivers to start with.
See, e.g., J. MORGAN, I. SIRAGELDIN, & N. BAERWALT, PRODUCTIVE AMERICANS: A STUDY
OF How INDIVIDUALS CONTRIBUTE TO ECONOMiC PROGRESS 546 (1966).
31. See H. Ross & D. Campbell, supra note 22.
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some inconvenience and expense, especially when coupled with the
increased risk of license suspension under point systems, may have
a greater psychological effect on the driver than harsh penalties in
the first instance.3 2 It has also been suggested that the lack of uni-
formity in the traffic laws of various states may limit the effectiveness
of legal sanctions. Although uniformity is undoubtedly of great im-
portance on matters related to driver perception and reaction (road
markings, signs, and hand signals), it is not established that the
relatively minor differences in detail of traffic laws from state to
state have any adverse consequences.83
Although the deterrent role of legal sanctions cannot be rejected
on the grounds discussed above, there is a basis for skepticism con-
cerning the performance of the present system of traffic regulation
on two grounds: (1) extremely low apprehension rates and enforce-
ment levels may dilute the potential deterrent effect; and (2) the
causal relationship between behavior that results in violations and
accidents has not been dearly established.
1. Low Risk of Apprehension
In contrast to some crimes, such as burglary, in which a victim
almost invariably reports a loss, most traffic violations are never re-
ported to the police. Because a victim is usually lacking, there is no
one to prod the police into taking action, provide evidence if a
prosecution results, and reinforce the moral aspect of the criminal
law. The initiative in detecting and prosecuting traffic offenses must
come from enforcement officials themselves; their effectiveness in this
endeavor depends upon such factors as the importance assigned to
traffic control in relation to other police activities, the number of
police officers available for traffic duties, and the organization of the
police force.3 4 One seemingly mundane but important factor that
reduces enforcement levels relates to the arrangements for compen-
sating police officers who must testify in court concerning traffic
violations. In some communities the arresting policeman is required
32. See, e.g., Janis & Feshbach, supra note 29, at 78.
33. See A. D. Lrrrl.E, INc., supra note 26, at 229. There is a plausible argument
that differences in the definition of traffic offenses may contribute to the more lenient
enforcement often encountered by out-of-state drivers since the out-of-stater may
claim or possess unfamiliarity with local rules relating to parking, U-turns, and the
like.
34. Gardiner, Traffic Law Enforcement in Massachusetts, 1968 (unpublished PhM.
dissertation at Harvard University).
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to appear in traffic court during his spare time without compensa-
tion. Under these circumstances, an officer may either refrain from
writing a ticket altogether or may write one for some lesser offense
that does not require a court appearance.
The present system of regulating traffic offenses reflects a relative
lack of concern with the individual violation. The objective in
police enforcement of traffic laws is not to prevent all deviant be-
havior but to establish acceptable norms of behavior by creating a
feeling of surveillance that will induce the vast majority of drivers
to move toward the goal of conformity with the regulations. A reduc-
tion in the number and severity of an individual's violations will
improve the total operation of the traffic system and reduce the
number of accidents. Unlike more serious criminal offenses, such as
rape or aggravated assult, incomplete apprehension and selective
prosecution are not inconsistent with enforcement objectives and
practices.35 The odds of apprehension for a particular violation are
indeed very low. An informal study by Professor Sheehe, for ex-
ample, found that the chance of receiving a speeding citation going
more than ten miles per hour above the speed limit on a particular
stretch of highway in Michigan was only 1 in 7,600.30 Unless it is
assumed that persons actually arrested for traffic violations are
habitual offenders whose violation frequency is so high that they are
occasionally arrested (not an unlikely hypothesis), there is an ele-
ment of fortuity in every traffic arrest.
Even if the public dramatically overestimates the chances of
apprehension, the perceived risk is at such a low level that the de-
terrent effect of traffic prohibitions is sharply limited. Scattered evi-
dence indicates that increased enforcement levels will sharply reduce
the total number of moving violations for such offenses as speeding.37
As stepped-up enforcement efforts in particular cities or on par-
ticular highways become widely known, they tend to have the effect
of grouping drivers in those areas around a median speed.
Studies of enforcement levels, relating the intensity of patrol
activity to some measure of driver behavior such as the frequency of
accidents or traffic violations, are recent developments which promise
to provide a rational approach to measuring the costs and benefits of
35. F. Zimring, Punishment Theory and Traffic Offenders, April 25, 1966, at 5-6
(unpublished manuscript at the University of Michigan Law School).
36. See A. D. LiTTLE, INC., supra note 26, at 245.
37. See E. SnUmATE, EFFECT OF INCREASED PATROL ON ACCIDENTs, DIVERSION, AND
SPEED (1958); Michaels, The Effects of Enforcement on Traffic Behavior, 31 PUBIC
RoADs 109 (1960); authorities cited notes 88 & 39 infra.
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traffic regulation. A 1960 report by Irby and Jacobs suggested that a
relatively extreme intensification of patrol effort would produce
measurable results in terms of more careful driving and thus tend
to reduce accident rates.38 An extensive experiment on U.S. 101
north of San Diego, California, involved doubling the state patrol
on the road in 1964.39 Although traffic increased 8 per cent during
this period, accidents declined 12 per cent and serious accidents
declined by more than 20 per cent. Observers operating indepen-
dently of the enforcement units counted fewer traffic violations after
the change than before. An important collateral benefit of intensified
patrol is hastened official response to accidents, a significant factor in
reducing rural fatalities.
There is so much driving behavior, and it is so dispersed in time
and space, that traffic police, using present methods of surveillance
and enforcement, face a virtually insurmountable task. Periodic
campaigns and selective enforcement schemes are designed to give
the public the impression that the objective apprehension rate is
much higher than it actually is. Such activities as using empty police
cars, dummy radar boxes, and cardboard policemen have a Beau
Geste quality that may achieve modest results if not overused, but
little precise information about the effects of these schemes is pres-
ently available. Further study of the effect of enforcement levels on
accidents, violations, and driver behavior is essential. Existing re-
search information pertains almost entirely to interstate highways,
roads that have the lowest accident rates in any event. Effective
enforcement on secondary roads and in urban traffic patterns may
require radically different approaches and strategies; what these
approaches should be, however, remains unclear. In view of the high
cost of patrol activities and the desirability of minimizing the citi-
zen's confrontations with police authority, the development of auto-
mated techniques of detecting violations, warning drivers, and using
records of adverse performance to identify drivers in need of further
education may offer substantial promise.
2. Relation of Violations to Accidents
Traffic laws are designed to prohibit unsafe driving behavior
that is likely to result in accidents. Although safe driving can be
38. An Epidemiological Approach to the Control of Automobile Accidents: Experi-
mental Patrol Intensification at a Military Base, 4 TRA'ixc SAFETY RESEARCH REv. 4
(March 1960).
39. Crittenden, Operation 101, THE POLICE CHEF, Jan. 1966, at 8.
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demonstrated and operationally defined, what constitutes safe driv-
ing is enormously complex and variable. Driving behavior that is
safe on a clear, dry, uncongested highway in a vehicle in top condi-
tion may be unsafe if one of these factors is varied. The attempt to
provide simple and understandable norms in defining traffic offenses
creates the risk that violation-producing behavior may be imperfectly
correlated with accident-producing behavior.
Efforts to enforce arbitrary speed restrictions illustrate this diffi-
culty. Speed is presumably regulated largely because it is related to
the driver's ability to control his vehicle. Yet many other factors, not
reflected in the enforcement of speed limits, affect this ability. On a
wet pavement, for example, a vehicle with bald tires may require
a stopping distance half again as great as a similar vehicle equipped
with tires having an adequate tread pattern. Appropriate driving
speeds depend not only upon weather, light, and road conditions,
but also upon vehicle and driver condition. Drivers are aware that
they can drive safely on many highways at speeds considerably in
excess of the established limits, particularly at times when traffic is
light and weather conditions are excellent. While enforcement of
unrealistic speed limits on such occasions may reduce average speeds,
it is questionable whether such enforcement reduces the frequency
of accidents. If reduced speeds are enforced under conditions of poor
visibility, slippery surfaces, or highway congestion-where speed is
more closely correlated with the occurrence of accidents-the fre-
quency and severity of accidents are probably reduced; but the
magnitude of these effects, if any, has not been established. A study of
college students, for example, showed no correlation between speed-
ing citations and accident rates.40 Other data indicate that drivers
who have committed no traffic offenses are involved in a substantial
fraction (one third) of all accidents and that many drivers who have
repeated violations have never been involved in an accident.41
More generally, a number of studies have found that drivers who
have more citations also tend to be involved in more accidents.42
The relationship of accidents and traffic violations, however, remains
somewhat obscure. Most of the studies relating accidents to citations
have failed to correct for the fact that a high proportion of reported
40. Stewart, Reported Driving Speeds and Previous Accidents, 41 J. APPLiD PsYcH.
293 (1957).
41. R. CoppN & R. PECK, THE 1964 CALIFORMNA DRivER REcom STUDY pts. 4, 6, 7
(1965).
42. See A. D. LrrTLE, INC., supra note 26, at 245-47.
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accidents results in one of the drivers receiving a moving violation,
a factor that tends to correlate accidents with violations in any event.
In the few instances in which this correction has been made, as in a
series of California studies using statewide data,43 the possibility that
the relationship between accidents and violations arises because of
increased exposure to the road has not yet been negatived: it may be
that many drivers have more citations and more accidents simply
because they drive more miles than most other drivers. Thus, it has
not been conclusively established that driving behavior which leads
to traffic violations also leads to accidents. There is an urgent need
for more reliable information concerning the relationship among
violations, citations, and accidents, not only as a general proposition
but with respect to specific kinds of violations. Enforcement activity
should be directed at behavior that is likely to make a difference in
terms of accident prevention and not merely at such easily detected
behavior as modest speeding on open roads in clear weather.
C. Drunk Driving
It is now well established that alcohol impairs driving ability;
that the extent of impairment is related to the amount consumed;
and that the occurrence and severity of highway accidents is directly
related to the consumption of alcohol by drivers.44 Blood tests per-
formed on fatally injured drivers in the United States indicate that
60 to 75 per cent of them have blood alcohol concentrations of
0.05 per cent or more; and that 40 to 50 per cent of fatally injured
drivers attain concentrations of 0.15 per cent or more.45 The much
lower incidence of drinking among nonaccident drivers exposed to
43. See, e.g., R. CoPPN, A. LEw, & R. PECK, supra note 41, pt. 7 (1966).
44. See generally Cramton, The Problem of the Drinking Driver, 54 A.B.A. J. 995
(1968); Haddon, Alcohol and Highway Accidents, in PROCEEiNGs OF THIRD INTERNA-
TIONAL CONFERENCE ON ALCOHOL AND ROAD TRAFFIC 3 (1962); McFarland, Alcohol and
Highway Accidents-A Summary of Present Knowledge, TRAFFIC DIGEST & REv., May,
1968, at So.
45. R. BORKENSTEIN, R. CROWTHER, E. SCHu'MATE, W. ZIEL, & R. ZYLMAN, THE ROLE
OF THE DRINKING DRIVER IN TRAFFIC AccIDENTs (1964); Haddon & Bradess, Alcohol in
the Single Vehicle Fatal Accident, in ACCIDENT RESEARCH, METHODS AND APPROACHES
208 (1964); McCarroll & Haddon, A Controlled Study of Fatal Automobile Accidents
in New York City, in ACCIDENT RESEARCH, METHODS AND APPROACHES 172 (1964);
Schmidt & Smart, Alcoholics, Drinking and Traffic Accidents, 20 Q. J. STUDIES ON
ALCOHOL 631 (1959).
In order to reach a blood alcohol level of 0.15 per cent, a 150-pound man must
consume at least 7 ounces of 80 proof whiskey in one hour. See Greenberg, The
Pharmacology of Alcohol and Its Relationship to Drinking and Driving, Q. J. STUDIES
ON ALCOHOL, May, 1968, supp. no. 4 at 252, 258.
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the same risks provides strong evidence that the risk of accident-
involvement increases as blood-level concentration increases. 6
The identification of alcohol as a leading factor associated with
automobile accidents (especially of the more serious variety) war-
rants vigorous methods of regulatory control. In theory, at least,
American states have adopted methods of strict control: criminal
prohibitions against drunk driving carry relatively severe penalties; 47
presumptions of intoxication based on chemical tests facilitate
proof;48 and implied consent statutes adopted in a growing number
of states require the driver, on pain of losing his license, to submit
to a chemical test of intoxication.49 Nevertheless, the feeling persists
that enforcement is lax in the United States and that the potential
effectiveness of legal control has not been achieved. There is greater
uncertainty whether the path to improvement lies in increasing the
apprehension and conviction rates, or modifying the severity of the
penalty, or both.
1. Increasing the Apprehension Rate
Effective deterrence requires a belief on the part of those who
drive when intoxicated that violators stand a good chance of being
detected and, once detected, punished. In this respect drunk driving,
like other traffic offenses, falls far short of the ideal. There is simply
too much human behavior to be effectively watched-millions of
drinking drivers on thousands of miles of highway night and day
around the clock. Enforcement officials, relatively few in number,
employ periodic campaigns of selective enforcement such as holiday
drives, but the odds of the drinking driver being apprehended are
minuscule when compared to the total number of violations.
Legal control of the drinking driver is also limited by the en-
46. R. BORKENSTEIN, R. CROWTHER, E. SCHUMATE, W. ZIEL, & R. ZYLMAN, THE ROLE
OF TnE DRINKING DRIVER IN TRAFFIC ACCIDENTS (1964).
47. In 1966 a conviction for driving while intoxicated required mandatory revoca-
tion or suspension of the driver's license for a year or more in twenty states and for
varying lesser periods in twenty-four states and the District of Columbia. In six states
such a conviction permitted but did not require revocation or suspension. AUTOMOBILE
SAFETY FOUNDATION, SUSPENSION AND REVOCATION OF DRIVERS' LICENSES 13 (rev. ed.
1966).
48. See UNIF. VEH. CODE § 11-902 (rev. ed. 1962).
49. Twenty-eight states had adopted implied-consent legislation as of early 1968.
NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACrS 52 (1968). See generally R. DONIGAN, CHEM-
ICAL TESTS AND THE LAW (1957); Donigan, Chemical Test Law in the United States,
TRAFFIC DIGEST & REV., April, 1966, at 21-23. A model statute is proposed and discussed
in Note, A State Statute To Prevent the Operation of Motor Vehicles by Persons Under
the Influence of Alcohol, 4 HARv. J. LEGIS. 280 (1967).
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forcement techniques that may be employed.50 In the United States
a driver generally may not be stopped and asked to submit to a
chemical test of intoxication unless observably deviant driving be-
havior such as speeding, weaving, or lane changing provides prob-
able cause for an arrest.51 Moreover, unlike the techniques employed
under recent legislation in Great Britain,5 2 the patrol car usually is
not equipped to permit officers to make a simple breath test for
intoxication; rather, the police officer must make a visual determina-
tion of intoxication before taking the suspect to the station house for
a chemical test. Since the statutory presumption in most states is set
at a relatively high level (0.15 per cent blood alcohol) and the
policeman must expend energy to bring the suspect in and book him
whether or not he is able to pass the test, the operational pressures
are toward a conservative judgment of intoxication. There are
grounds for thinking that in the United States only cases of extreme
intoxication lead to convictions for drunk driving.53
There is some reliable evidence from Scandinavia and now
Great Britain that improved enforcement of prohibitions against
drunk driving would reduce accidents.5" In Norway, for example,
where drivers found to have a blood alcohol level in excess of 0.05
per cent are regularly given short jail sentences, Professor Andenaes
reported that fewer than four per cent of the drivers involved in
fatal accidents in 1960 were found to be driving under the influence
of alcohol. 5 Since the corresponding figure in the United States for a
50. See Borkenstein, Trubitt, & Lease, Problems of Enforcement and Prosecution,
in ALCOHOL AND TRAFFIC SAFETY 137 (1963).
51. The authority of a police officer to arrest without a warrant is generally limited
to situations in which a misdemeanor is occurring in the officer's presence. See gen-
erally W. LAFAvE, ARREST 231-43 (1965). Since the police officer must have reason to
believe that an offense has been committed, deviant behavior or its accident conse-
quences must usually have been observed by the officer. The requirement imposed on
a driver by implied-consent statutes to submit to a chemical test of intoxication is
also usually limited by some sort of "reasonable cause" determination by the officer. See,
e.g., MICH. CoMP. LAws § 257.625c (Supp. 1968): A driver must submit to a chemical
test "at the request of a law enforcement officer having reasonable grounds to believe
the person was driving a vehicle upon the public highways . . . while under the in-
fluence of intoxicating liquor."
52. Road Safety Act of 1967, c. 16.
53. Hyman, The Social Characteristics of Persons Arrested for Driving While In-
toxicated, Q. J. STUDIES ON ALCOHOL, May, 1968, supp. no. 4 at 252; Selzer, Payne,
Gifford, & Kelley, Alcoholism, Mental Illness and the "Drunk Driver", 120 Am. J.
PSYc-. 326, 326-31 (1963).
54. See generally Goldberg, Drunken Drivers in Sweden, in PROCEEDINGS OF SECOND
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ALCOHOL AND ROAD TRAFFIC 112-27 (1955); Christie,
Scandinavian Experience in Legislation and Control, in THE LEGAL ISSUES IN ALCOHOL-
ISM AND ALCOHOL USAGE 101-22 (1965).
55. Andenaes, The General Preventive Effects of Punishment, 114 U. PA. L. REv.
949, 969 n.39 (1966).
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much higher level of impairment (0.15 per cent rather than 0.05) is at
least ten times as large, it seems likely that strict regulatory control
has reduced the incidence of driving after drinking.
Personal accounts from individuals familiar with Scandinavian
enforcement practices attest that strict enforcement has affected
attitudes and behavior. As Professor Andenaes has stated:
The awareness of hazards of imprisonment for intoxicated driving
is in [Norway] a living reality to every driver, and for most people
the risk seems too great. When a man goes to a party where alcoholic
drinks are likely to be served, and if he is not fortunate enough to
have a wife who drives but does not drink, he will leave his car at
home or he will limit his consumption to a minimum .... [T]he
legislation has been instrumental in forming or sustaining the wide-
spread conviction that it is wrong, or irresponsible, to place oneself
behind the wheel when intoxicated. 56
There are, however, several reasons for doubting whether the
Scandinavian experience is fully transferable to the American scene.
First, alcoholism has been such a serious problem in the Scandi-
navian countries that public attitudes toward alcoholics are very
different than in the United States. There is a strong, publicly sup-
ported temperance movement, and problem drinkers are subjected
to a degree of surveillance undreamed of in the United States.57
Second, legislative proscription of driving after drinking was adopted
in Scandinavia many years ago when drivers were still a small
minority of the population. Strict regulation became accepted and
shaped public attitudes before driving became a mass phenomenon.
The sudden introduction of new rules in America's highly motorized
society-one in which the private car plays dual roles of necessary
transportation and ego gratification-is likely to encounter greater
popular and official resistance. Finally, on the basis of the sketchy
data now available, it remains uncertain whether severe penalties are
crucial to effective enforcement of the drunk-driving laws. Even if
they are crucial, it is questionable whether a potential improvement
in highway safety is worth the resultant restrictions on personal
liberty and the sufferings inflicted on punished drivers and their
families.
In Sweden, for example, over one half of the persons sentenced
to prison are convicted of alcohol-related traffic offenses.58 Moreover,
56. Id. at 969.
57. See Christie, Temperance Boards and Inter-Institutional Dilemmas: A Case
Study of Welfare Law, 12 SocAL PROBLEMS 415 (1965).
58. Klette, Effects of Legislation Concerning Drunken Driving in Sweden, in PRO-
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there appear to be social class differences in the deterrent effect of
the severe sanctions. Members of the upper classes, who have other
means of transportation and whose stake in society is threatened
by the severe punishment, generally conform to the law's command;
convicted violators tend to come from the lower classes and from
special groups, such as single males, whose alternatives are more
limited. Sanctions capable of effectively controlling these lower-class
and special groups may be more difficult to design than sanctions
effective against the upper classes. The intractability of the problem,
at least with some segments of the population, does not argue that
control measures are not worthwile. It is merely emphasized that
the differential effects on various groups and social classes should not
be overlooked when deciding on countermeasures. It would be
anomalous, for example, in this day of positive public effort to re-
lease Negro citizens from cycles of poor education, low employment
opportunity, and slow social advance, to employ repressive measures
in the highway safety field that bear down most heavily on these
same persons.
2. Overly Severe Penalties
The relationship between legal sanctions and social attitudes is a
complex one. If penalties are viewed as excessive, the effectiveness of
the legal sanction may be reduced because of public authorities'
reluctance to convict. No law can be effectively enforced in a de-
mocracy unless the public shares the values and premises upon which
that law is based; our experiment with a drastic form of liquor
control-prohibition-demonstrated that. With respect to drinking-
driving, there is widespread agreement that this behavior is a prob-
lem and that highway safety is an important value. The value is
not viewed in isolation, however, but in relation to conflicting
values. Thus, when balanced against the need to control drinking-
driving, the individual's desire to use his vehicle as an extension of
his personality or to engage in pleasurable activity such as partying
or drinking may well be preferred by a large portion of the popu-
lace. The ubiquitous nature of drinking-driving increases sympathy
for those who are caught and pushes police, prosecutors, courts, and
juries toward a lenient approach. The stringent nature of the
penalties adds to this pressure towards leniency. In the abstract the
-F.DINGS OF THiRD INTERNATONAL CONFERENCE ON ALCOHOL AND ROAD TRAFFIc 332
(1963).
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public believes that a drunk driver should lose his license; but in the
concrete individual situation involving a person who is thought to
be like everyone else and who needs a license for work and pleasure,
the punitive attitude softens. In fact, the usual drunk driver may be
pathologically very different than the ordinary social drinker, but
the public either does not realize this or ignores it. The reaction of
the ordinary juror is likely to be: "We all live it up once in a while;
only he was unfortunate enough to get caught."
Consider the experience in Michigan over the last ten years:5 9
fatalities have increased by 50 per cent; reported accidents have
doubled; the number of traffic officers, drivers, and vehicle miles has
increased rapidly. Yet arrests and convictions for drunk driving have
steadily declined. In 1957 there were 2,673 arrests for drunk driving
and 2,144 convictions; in 1966 these figures had fallen to 1,878
arrests and 1,357 convictions: Moreover, of those charged with drunk
driving in Michigan in 1966, only 72 per cent were convicted on the
original charge; nearly 10 per cent accepted a plea for a lesser offense
not involving license suspension; the remainder were either ac-
quitted or their cases are still pending. Data contained in a 1961
speech by the attorney general of California suggest that public atti-
tudes in California at that time did not favor strict legal control of
drinking-driving: 60 of a group of more than 1,000 drivers who killed
someone while driving under the influence of alcohol, only one
fourth were convicted of the felony of drunk driving, and fewer than
5 per cent were sent to jail.
Enforcement officials tend toward the view that the drunk-driver
problem can be handled by more and better enforcement: more
traffic police, better detection techniques such as roaming check
lanes and wholesale breath-testing, and stricter penalties. While
better detection techniques should definitely be explored, it is doubt-
ful that increasingly severe penalties will accomplish anything bar-
ring a monumental-and unlikely-change in public attitudes. The
regulatory control of drinking-driving in the United States is rather
lax precisely because the social climate does not favor more stringent
controls. Stiffer penalties will merely lead to more difficulty in
enforcement. Arguably, legal sanctions would be more effective if
better detection techniques were combined with more modest
59. Letter from Captain Dan A. Downer, Safety and Traffic Division, Michigan
State Police, to the author, July 15, 1967.
60. Fort, Drinking and Driving in California and the United States, in PROCEEDINGS
OF TIRDa INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON ALCOHOL AND ROAD TRAFIC 339 (1963).
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penalties. Periodic and random breath-testing of drivers would en-
hance detection of the drunk driver; and this approach might be
politically and constitutionally acceptable if combined with reduced
penalties. One possible approach is as follows. Traffic officers would
stop and check random samples of drivers on a scientific basis. If
a breath test showed a blood-level concentration above 0.08 per cent,
the driver would be considered dangerous and driven home in a po-
lice car. If the driver's car was not a traffic hazard in its existing loca-
tion, it would be left there; otherwise it would be impounded. When
the driver sobered up the next morning he would face the incon-
venience of retrieving his car. Instances of violation would be re-
ported to state licensing officials and noted on the driver's record. If
caught three or more times, the licensing officials would require him
to report for treatment as a "problem drinker" or face losing his
license. The system would operate completely without criminal
penalties: the embarrassment of being driven home in a police car
and the inconvenience of retrieving one's vehicle would be the
exclusive "civil" penalties; treatment for the problem drinker would
be enforced by possible license suspension.61
3. Addicted Persons-The Problem Drinker
Until recently, it has been assumed that, since the majority of
persons who use alcohol are "social drinkers," most of the accidents
in which alcohol is a factor involve driving after social drinking.
This assumption is now questioned by a number of responsible in-
vestigators who assert that pathological drinking accounts for the
larger part of alcohol-related accidents.6 2 A detailed retrospective
study of the personality and drinking behavior of a small group of
fatally injured drivers revealed an astonishingly large proportion of
problem drinkers.6 3 Other studies indicate that few social drinkers
attain the elevated blood alcohol levels (in excess of 0.15 per cent) so
frequently found among serious- and fatal-accident victims. Although
the dispute over whether social drinkers or alcoholics account for
the majority of alcohol-related accidents cannot be resolved on exist-
61. A similar suggestion for a civil and regulatory approach to the drunk driver is
made in H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANcTION 251-56 (1968).
62. See, e.g., Schmidt, Smart, & Popham, The Role of Alcoholism in Motor Vehicle
Accidents, 6 TRAFIic SAFETY REsEARCH REv. Dec. 1962, at 21; Selzer, Automobile Acci-
dents and the Alcoholic Personality: An Unrecognized Dilemma, 89 MIc. ST. B.J. 12
(1960); Seizer, Payne, Gifford, & Kelley, Alcoholism, Mental Illness and the "Drunk
Driver", 120 AM. J. PsYcH. 326 (1963).
63. Seizer & Weiss, Alcoholism and Traffic Fatalities: Study in Futility, 122 AM. J.
PsYcH. 762 (1966).
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ing data, it is likely that both groups make a substantial contribu-
tion to the drinking-driving problem. Enough is known at present
to cast doubt upon the simple dichotomy between social drinkers
and alcoholics. A more sophisticated classification of drinkers, in-
volving the reasons why they drink and the setting in which they
drink, is needed. The social context of drinking, the social class of
the drinker, the pathological character of his behavior, and the inter-
play between the individual's behavior pattern and his personality
are factors that need to be considered.
The probable presence of a substantial group of addicted persons
in the offending population raises several questions relevant to the
effectiveness of legal sanctions in this area. First, it is sometimes
argued that sanctions will not have the intended deterrent effect
with problem drinkers, since they are supposedly incapable of
rational or conscious choice.64 The difficulty with this argument is
that the prohibition against driving after drinking does not require
an alcoholic to stop drinking, but merely to do his drinking under
circumstances in which it is not necessary for him to use an auto-
mobile. That choice, made prior to the commencement of drinking,
may be consciously influenced by the imposition of legal sanctions.
Admittedly, however, legal sanctions will probably operate less effec-
tively as the behavior involved is habitual, addictive, or pathological.
For this reason, the presence in the offending group of a substantial
number of problem drinkers has important implications for the
design of the regulatory system. Punishment may well be less effec-
tive in shaping the behavior of such persons. Apprehension of alco-
holics may serve to identify them; but if rehabilitation is to occur,
addicted persons must be separated from social drinkers and ade-
quate treatment facilities provided for them. Further knowledge is
desperately needed if we are to deal satisfactorily with the phenom-
enon of the problem drinker. Moreover, once attention is focused on
attempted solutions, public support will be essential if any system of
legal sanctions is to be effective.
64. See Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968), in which the Court held that prosecu-
tion for public drunkenness did not violate the cruel and unusual punishment clause
of the eighth amendment. Justice Fortas, writing for four dissenting Justices, while
concluding that a chronic alcoholic may not be punished for public drunkenness
because of his inability to control his actions, distinguished the drunk-driving situa-
tion: "Such offenses require independent acts or conduct and do not typically flow
from and are not part of the syndrome of the disease of chronic alcoholism." S92
U.S. at 559 n.2.
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D. Civil Liability-The Negligence and Insurance Systems
The general deterrent effect of civil liability is much discussed
but little understood. Many legal scholars appear to feel that any
such deterrent effect is a small one, but there is no unanimity of
opinion.65 In the absence of empirical knowledge, the following
hypotheses seem plausible: (1) The widespread use of various kinds
of insurance insulates the negligent driver from the economic con-
sequences of an accident. As a result, although some may wish to
avoid legal proceedings or insurance cancellation, fear of liability
by itself does not constitute a substantial deterrent. (2) An accident,
as mentioned earlier, is a more remote consequence than apprehen-
sion for a traffic violation; civil liability is even more distant from
the concerns of thoughtless and imprudent drivers. Individuals who
are not deterred by enforcement of traffic regulations nor by a con-
cern for their own safety are unlikely to be deterred by potential
civil liability arising out of such an accident. (3) The current lia-
bility system offers to the driver only the general admonition to
"drive safely"-advice which is not specific enough to inculcate good
driving habits and weed out bad ones. Moreover, to the driver who
experiences civil liability, the adversary and admonitory tone of
settlement negotiations and proceedings may harden him in the self-
righteous belief that he is a good driver and the "other fellow" is
to blame. Consequently, he is unlikely to learn anything from the
experience that will improve his driving in the future.
The deterrent effects of civil liability, whatever their magnitude,
are more likely to be reflected in the operation of the automobile
insurance system than in the imposition of money judgments. The
traffic violation or accident that triggers a dramatic increase in a
driver's insurance rate may encourage him to improve his record in
order to regain a lower rate. As it becomes known that bad driving
records result in higher insurance costs, a general deterrent effect
may result. Upward or downward variation of insurance rates predi-
cated on driver behavior may also release family pressures that other-
wise might not be operative: if substantially higher insurance costs
result, a teenager's fender-denting may lead to forms of parental
supervision regulating the amount and manner of his driving.
The insurance system also offers opportunities to encourage
65. Compare Blum & Kalvan, The Empty Cabinet of Dr. Calabresi: Auto Accidents
and General Deterrence, 34 U. Cm. L. REv. 239 (1967) with Calabresi, Fault, Accidents
and the Wonderful World of Blum and Kalven, 75 YAiz L.J. 216 (1965).
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desirable conduct by utilizing rewards in addition to penalties. Psy-
chologists tell us that conformity to particular standards of behavior
is enhanced if, in addition to penalizing improper responses, proper
responses are rewarded.66 An insurance system which places the costs
of hazardous driving behavior on those who engage in it tends to
reward good drivers and punish bad ones. If bad drivers were
required to bear the full costs of their activities, few could afford
adequate insurance coverage and some might be removed from the
road. However, the pressures of insurance regulation tend to be
egalitarian in nature, and it would be unrealistic to suppose that any
substantial portion of the populace could be kept off the roads on
the basis of prohibitive insurance rates. Even if such extreme mea-
sures are not feasible, modest steps such as merit-rating plans and
safe-driver rebates, in effect in Great Britain for many years and
increasingly popular in this country, offer deterrent possibilities
that should receive further study.
E. Rehabilitation of the Problem Driver
The educative and habituative effects of traffic laws on the gen-
eral driving population should be distinguished from the impact
which apprehension has on the individual offender. The latter effect
is often referred to as special prevention or special deterrence to
distinguish it from general deterrence.6 7 Except for a small number
of serious traffic offenses such as drunk driving, negligent homicide,
and driving after license suspension, punishment will usually con-
sist of the imposition of fines and costs on the violator. Moreover,
under point systems now in operation in several states, licensing
officials may take disciplinary action when violation or accident
records attain certain levels.6
Traffic courts play a major role in present programs of driver
rehabilitation, but their effectiveness is subject to question. The
Traffic Court Program of the American Bar Association has sought,
in conjunction with state and federal authorities, to upgrade the
quality of traffic-court justice.69 One objective of the program is to
66. See notes 16-17 supra and accompanying text.
67. See notes 9-10 supra and accompanying text.
68. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWs §§ 257.320, 257.320a (1965 & Supp. 1968).
69. See J. ECONoMos, REPORT To THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDING COM-
MITTEE ON TRAFFIC COURT PROBLEM, TRAFFIC COURT PROCEDURE AND ADMINISTRATION
(1961); J. ECONOMoS, REPORT TO THE AMERICAN BAR AsSOcIATION STANDING COMMITTEE
ON TRAgFiC COURT PROBLEM, THE TRAFFIC PROBLEM, TRAFFIC LAW, AND TRAFFIC COURTS
(1957).
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ensure that a traffic offense of any seriousness will lead to a court
appearance in which a judge, a prosecuting attorney, a police wit-
ness, and the suspect will consider the accusation with dignity and
fairness. The underlying premise is that an adjudication of guilt
under such circumstances will have an educative influence on the
offender; moreover, it may increase his respect for the legal system
in general. However, it seems doubtful that traffic court adjudica-
tions will have these intended effects. The required court appear-
ance increases the inconvenience and severity of the apprehended
driver's confrontation with legal authority; whether or not he is
found guilty, he may find the experience irritating. Costs to the
public in terms of working time lost and to the police in requiring
the attendance of the arresting officer are substantial. Unless the
driver is provided with free counsel and given a fair opportunity to
defend-an outcome that we hardly want to stimulate artificially
given the high cost of such proceedings and their small stakes-the
proceeding may appear to the driver as one in which the traffic
policeman's word is always accepted in preference to his own.
Placing the driver in the position of defending his conduct may
lead him to rationalize his behavior rather than consider his driving
defects objectively. Moreover, traffic courts are not ordinarily
equipped to offer the offender specific assistance that may improve
his future driving skills. Even if traffic courts can achieve an educa-
tive influence on drivers superior to that achieved by comparable
systems of control, it is not clear that the benefits in accident reduc-
tion outweigh the undesirable collateral consequences. These doubts,
however, are not supported by empirical data. The effectiveness of
traffic court programs in rehabilitating drivers has never been ade-
quately demonstrated, to the author's knowledge, and no informa-
tion is presently available. The possible shortcomings suggested above
therefore constitute appropriate subjects for future investigation.
The rehabilitative value of driver improvement programs is also
somewhat questionable. Motor vehicle licensing authorities in most
states administer substantial programs aimed at correcting the habits
or improving the capabilities of errant drivers. The effort-directed
primarily at drivers who have accumulated a certain level of viola-
tions or accidents-is designed to educate and to change basic atti-
tudes. Research into the effectiveness of various kinds of driver im-
provement programs, however, is not particularly heartening. Some
studies indicate that drivers who are sent a warning letter (especially
a cordial and personalized one) do have somewhat better records
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than similar drivers who do not receive such letters.70 But further
educative efforts such as individual counseling sessions, group
therapy, and "scare" movies have been largely ineffective.71 A New
York study, for example, concluded that "neither of the practical
measures of driver improvement-accident and violation reduc-
tion-appear to be much affected by conventional driver improve-
ment efforts." 72 While drivers who are identified as needing re-
habilitation do tend to improve their driving habits with time
(perhaps as a result of greater maturity), the imposition of a driver
improvement program does not appear to have a significant impact
on the rate of improvement. It may be concluded that "a person
drives as he lives"; a few sessions with a driver improvement analyst
will not affect deep-seated personality traits and attitudes.
More experimentation with various rehabilitative techniques is
necessary in order to devise more effective driver improvement pro-
grams and to determine whether benefits outweigh costs. It is pos-
sible that the most economic means of improving driver habits is to
raise apprehension rates by employing more policemen and better
detection methods. But given the crying need for other uses of police
in our troubled society, resulting benefits from increased enforce-
ment activity must also be weighed in the light of broader social
considerations.
The ultimate sanction of licensing authorities is the withdrawal
of a driver's license. The sanction is somewhat perverse in that a
driver can hardly be expected to improve his skills while legally
unable to drive.73 The unstated premise of licensing authorities is
that problem drivers have bad attitudes rather than poorly devel-
oped skills and that a more serious punishment will encourage them
to approach driving in a more responsible manner. Whether or not
70. See M. CHALFANT & G. KING, STUDIES ON THE EFFECTIVENESS OF DRIVER IMPROVE-
MENT PROCEDURES (1960); Campbell, The Effects of Driver Improvement Actions on
Driving Behavior, in ACCIDENT RESEARCH, METHODS AND APPROACHES 638 (1964); Kaest-
ner, Warmoth, & Syring, The Effectiveness of Warning Letters in Driver Improvement,
67 TRAFFIC SAFETY RESEARCH REV. 67 (1967).
71. Campbell, supra note 70; R. Coppin, W. Marsh, & R. Peck, A Re-Evaluation
of Group Driver Improvement Meetings, 1965 (a report to the Cal. Dept. of Motor
Vehicles); 0. SCHUSTER, EVALUATION OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF DRIVER IMPROVEMFNT
CLASSES FOR PROBLEM DRIVERS (1965). But cf. Henderson & Kole, New Jersey Driver
Improvement Clinics: An Evaluation Study, 67 TRAFFIC SAFETY RESEARCH REV. 98
(1967); Kaestner & Syring, Accident and Violation Reduction Through Brief Driver
Improvement Interviews, 67 TRAFFIC SAFETY RESEARCH REV. 99 (1967).
72. B. Scott, New York State's Study of the Effect of Group Sessions on Persistent
Violators, 1967 (report of a discussion occurring at the Am. Assn. of Mot. Veh. Admin.
Workshop).
73. See F. Zimring, Punishment Theory and Traffic Offenders, April 25, 1966, at
18-20 (unpublished manuscript at the University of Michigan Law School).
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this premise is sound, it is fairly certain that many individuals whose
attitude toward driving was unresponsive to earlier and lighter treat-
ment will also be unwilling to sit out a period of license suspension.
Although more accurate data are needed, there are some indications
that a large majority of persons whose licenses are suspended or re-
voked continue to drive.74 Even if that is the case, of course, suspen-
sion may have demonstrable effects: individuals driving under sus-
pension may limit their driving in amount, or they may drive more
carefully because of the likelihood of harsh treatment if they are
apprehended.
III. RESEARCH METHODS
This survey of the state of the art of traffic safety indicates that
we do possess some useful knowledge concerning the deterrent effects
of attempts to regulate driver behavior through legal sanctions. In
addition to putting this knowledge to better use, we now need to
fill in some of the gaps in our present understanding by creatively
analyzing available data and by conducting controlled experiments. 75
A. Comparisons in Time and Space
Regulatory approaches to highway safety vary considerably from
state to state, and changes in legal control can be pinpointed in time
within a given state. Thus, the effects of a particular regulation may
be evaluated either by comparing the experience in several states
with differing regulations at one time or by comparing the results
before and after the institution of the new regulation in a single
state. The pitfalls encountered in this type of research are treach-
erous indeed; but the difficulties of the task should not divert the
attention of social scientists from the payoff that ingenuity in the
use of data can produce.7 6 For example, the effectiveness of motor
vehicle inspection is a problem that cries out for definitive study.
What vehicle defects contribute to the occurrence of accidents? Can
these defects be corrected by techniques of motor vehicle inspection?
Are the benefits in accident reduction worth the costs, direct and
74. R. Coppin & G. Van Oldenbeck, Driving Under Suspension and Revocation,
1965 (a report to the Calif. Dept. of Motor Vehicles).
75. For general discussion of research methodology in the legal context, see Morris,
Impediments to Penal Reform, 33 U. CI. L. REv. 627, 645-55 (1966); Andenaes, supra
note 55, at 973-78; Lempert, Strategies of Research Design in the Legal Impact Study:
The Control of Plausible Rival Hypotheses, I L. & Soc. REv. 111 (1967).
76. See Campbell & Stanley, Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs for
Research on Teaching, in HArianoor OF RasEACff Ou TEACHING 204 (Gage ed. 1963);
Lempert, supra note 75.
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indirect, of the inspection program? This series of questions is now
receiving detailed study, and when the data become available,
analysts must avoid the temptation of drawing simple-minded con-
clusions from data comparing various states. For some time much
was made of the fact that mileage fatality rates tended to be some-
what lower in states with motor vehicle inspection than in states
without it7 7 However, plausible rival hypotheses were not thor-
oughly examined; it may be that these small differences were due
to other factors, such as greater urbanization and denser population
in the inspection states, or better enforcement of vehicle equipment
regulations apart from inspection. Studies by the Highway Safety
Research Institute at the University of Michigan are now under
way to compare the condition of important pieces of equipment, such
as lights and brakes, in matched samples of vehicles drawn from
areas with and without inspection programs. Tentative conclusions
indicate that defects which the owner cannot easily detect or which
he is unaware are safety hazards are caught by motor vehicle inspec-
tion.r For example, owners tend to take care of headlights and tail-
lights on their own; the proportion of cars running with a missing
headlight or taillight is fairly uniform over the states without regard
to inspection. On the other hand, enforcement activity and inspec-
tion has a startling effect in reducing the number of broken
taillight lenses79 The data also indicate that motor vehicle inspec-
tion has a differential effect depending on the economic class of the
driver. Inspection tends to improve older vehicles driven by poorer
persons who are either oblivious to the condition of their vehicles
or who have little money for repairs.80 Studies of this nature will
provide a good understanding of the potential benefits and costs of
various types of inspection programs.
In making spatial and time comparisons, it cannot be assumed
77. See A. D. LITTLE, INC., THE STATE OF THE ART OF T.AFFIC SAFETY 274-85 (1966);
M. Mayer & T. Hoult, Motor Vehicle Inspection: A Report on Current Information,
Measurement, and Research, 1963 (a report to the Wayne State Univ. Institute for
Regional & Urban Studies).
78. J. Cresswell & J. O'Day, Periodic Motor Vehicle Inspection and Predictive Ana-
lytical Modeling, October, 1968 (research report made for the Univ. of Mich. Highway
Safety Research Institute); A. McCutcheon & H. Sherman, The Influence of Periodic
Motor Vehicle Inspection on Mechanical Condition, 1968 (report made to the Univ. of
Mich. Highway Safety Research Institute).
79. See authorities cited in note 78 supra. In Michigan, where there is no program of
motor vehicle inspection and lighting defects are not commonly ticketed, about one
in twenty vehicles has a broken tail lens; in Pennsylvania, where compulsory inspec-
tion and police enforcement result in prompt replacement of broken lenses, only
about 1 in 4,000 vehicles has a broken lens.
80. Buxbaum & Colton, Relationship of Motor Vehicle Inspection to Accident
Mortality, 197 J.A.M.A. 31 (1966).
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that other variables remain constant. The Connecticut speeding
crackdown of 1956, discussed earlier in this Article,"' illustrates the
difficulty of basing firm conclusions on retrospective study of data
concerning the effectiveness of a change in the law. The mere fact
that one jurisdiction has adopted a particular measure indicates that
it believed that it had a special problem; the situation that occa-
sioned the legislation may involve peculiarities that explain the data
produced. 2 For this reason early evidence from Great Britain indi-
cating the dramatic effectiveness of a 1967 breathalyzer program to
reduce driving after drinking must be accepted with some caution. 3
Moreover, a widely publicized program of law enforcement may
have short-term benefits unlikely to persist over time. Thus, pub-
licity and stepped-up enforcement may increase the public's percep-
tion of the risk of apprehension or the severity of punishment in a
way that affects behavior; as the public lives with the new program,
a more realistic assessment of the risks may lead to a deterioration
of earlier results. Differential effects of enforcement on various
groups (depending on such factors as age, race, marital status, sex,
and social class) should also be considered.
B. Controlled Experiments
The difficulties of retrospective research can be avoided by con-
ducting carefully constructed controlled experiments. Why not
handle randomly selected groups of offenders in a legally different
manner and compare the subsequent results in the experimental
treatment group with the results in a control group? In so doing,
we would solve some methodological problems but create some new
problems of a different order. Experiments on human subjects in-
volving legal requirements threaten a fundamental principle of the
legal order: that equals will be treated equally. If controlled experi-
ments were conducted, a deliberate inequality would be imposed
by the legal system contrary to this fundamental principle. Even
when done for proper motives in order to improve the lot of future
generations, the controlled experiment raises practical and political
81. Text accompanying note 22 supra.
82. Campbell, Factors Relevant to the Validity of Experiments in Social Settings,
54 PSYCH. BULL. 297, 297-812 (1957); authorities cited note 75 supra.
83. In December 1967, the British Ministry of Transport issued a press release
reporting that in October 1967, the first month in which the Road Safety Act of 1967
was in effect, there was a 12 per cent reduction in fatalities compared with October
1966. During the night hours from 8 p.m. to 4 a.m., when most fatalities involving
drunk drivers occur, there was a 36 per cent reduction in fatalities. U.S. Naws & WoRLu
REP., Feb. 19, 1968, at 101.
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questions which must be dealt with by administrators and lawyers
before researchers can be set free to conduct experiments on live
subjects. Professor Morris has argued that controlled experiments
on the effects of punishment are justifiable if two safeguards are
imposed: (1) the treatment group is given more favorable treatment
than is usually accorded the control group; and (2) the groups are
chosen by lottery so that everyone has an equal chance for the more
favorable treatment.8 4
In many ways highway safety is a fruitful area for controlled
experiments in the application of legal sanctions. As noted earlier,
the moral content of traffic violations is very low and public and
administrative attitudes toward regulation are rational in character.
Penalties tend to be mild and nonpunitive; and experimentation
with intensity of enforcement, levels of penalization, and types of
rehabilitative treatment is as rationally related to highway safety as
health research is to the prevention of disease. Moreover, officials
presently exercise a large degree of discretion on matters of enforce-
ment, sentencing, and treatment. As a result, the degree of variation
in treatment at present is so large that the temporary inequalities
caused by experiments are almost too insignificant to be noticed.
Whether or not the safeguards of "testing down" (giving the treat-
ment group more favored treatment) and of random selection will
prove adequate in other areas, they would seem sufficient to justify
increased experimentation in highway safety.
IV. CONCLUSION
What are the consequences of the application of legal sanctions?
How can these consequences be determined? This Article has at-
tempted to explore these questions in the limited field of highway
safety, examining the available evidence and indicating areas where
further investigation is essential. Although conclusions with respect
to the general deterrent effect of traffic laws do not emerge, the
parameters of the problem have been defined and plausible hypoth-
eses suggested.
There is ample evidence that human behavior can be influenced
by the application of legal sanctions. This influence is accomplished
because legal norms have a moral and educative influence; because
the potential offender fears the consequences attendant upon viola-
tion; and because the inculcation of norms-especially at an early
age and when periodically reinforced-results in habitual and un-
84. Morris, Impediments to Penal Reform, 33 U. CHi. L. REv. 627, 645-55 (1966).
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conscious behavior conforming to those norms. These general deter-
rent influences are highly variable depending upon such factors as
motivation to engage in the prohibited behavior, the personality of
the potential offender, and the conflicting norms of groups to which
the individual owes loyalty and affection. Apart from these general
variables, the effectiveness of a legal sanction depends, first and
most importantly, upon the perceived risk of apprehension and con-
viction, and, second, upon the severity of the penalty.
Regulations intended to prevent unwanted driver behavior
illustrate the general propositions stated above. General deterrence
operates very effectively in the enforcement of parking regulations
if any combination of a high apprehension rate or a substantial
monetary fine makes illegal parking more inconvenient and expen-
sive than legal parking. The effects of enforcing moving violations,
which are intended to deter behavior that is likely to result in acci-
dents, are more uncertain in nature and magnitude. Although negli-
gence in the performance of complex tasks such as driving may be
affected by the application of legal sanctions, the effectiveness of the
present system of traffic justice is limited by extremely low appre-
hension rates, difficulties in enforcement, and doubts as to whether
the right behavior is being affected. One serious issue is whether
traffic violations which the police can most easily detect constitute
the accident-producing behavior that society wants to reduce. This
problem is not present with respect to drunk driving for it is well
established that the occurrence of serious highway accidents is
directly related to the consumption of alcohol by drivers. As with
moving violations, however, the deterrent effect of present ap-
proaches to drunk driving is limited by low apprehension rates;
moreover, it is possible that overly severe penalties may contribute
to lower conviction rates. Better methods of detection, combined
with identification of problem drinkers and the development of im-
proved facilities for their treatment, offer the promise of increased
deterrence and lower accident rates. Although information concern-
ing the deterrent effects of potential civil liability is sparse, it seems
doubtful that such effects are of great magnitude; liability insurance
rates or policies that tend to reward good drivers and penalize bad
drivers would appear to offer greater potential for deterrence and
accident prevention. The rehabilitative effects of traffic courts, driver
improvement programs, and other present methods of handling
problem drivers (special deterrence) are also questionable: the
habitual violators who are identified for treatment appear to have
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deep-seated personality traits and attitudes that are not amenable to
inexpensive and expeditious methods of mass treatment.
Two principal research strategies are available to fill gaps in
present knowledge. Carefully constructed controlled experiments in
which the legal treatment of randomly selected groups of drivers is
varied over periods of time involve the fewest methodological prob-
lems but raise political and legal issues of considerable concern. To
the extent that controlled experiments prove infeasible, ingenious
use of "second-best" techniques-the careful and discriminating
analysis of retrospective data with respect to the effects of particular
regulations-will have to be relied upon. The methodological pit-
falls are many, but indications and conclusions drawn from a variety
of partial studies may still provide the basis for confident judgments.
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